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Unemployment compensation is often referred to as the "first line of defense" in
the total program for unemployment relief. It is important, therefore, to discover
where this line should be drawn. The relative importance of unemployment com-
pensation in a comprehensive relief program will, of course, be determined by the
initial scope of the compensation system (i.e., what employments and types of
workers are covered by the laws), the amount of benefit payable, its duration, the
length of the waiting period that must elapse before the unemployed worker is
entitled to benefits, and the stringency of the qualifying conditions.
If the remaining states set up laws under the Social Security Act on the pattern
of the io laws already in existence, the scope of unemployment compensation is likely
to be relatively small and the residual relief system correspondingly large. The
Social Security Act visualizes the exclusion of agriculture, domestic service, employ-
ment with non-profit-making concerns and with employers of less than eight workers.
Some of the state laws are more generous in their scope but except in the case of non-
competitive employments, fear of interstate competition will prevent them from
greatly exceeding the federal limitations.
As a general rule the existing laws limit benefits to 50 per cent of wages, with a
maximum of $15 and in some cases a minimum of $5 or $7- It is obvious that in the
low-paid trades benefits based on 50 per cent of wages will frequently require
supplementing from other (and often relief) sources. The duration of benefits is,
as a rule, 15 weeks, a relatively short period, in comparison with the average of
European plans. This short duration will make for an extremely large residual prob-
lem in periods of depression in view of the fact that unemployment tends to be con-
centrated on a portion only of workers. The average waiting period of 3 weeks may
in normal times involve no necessity for a supplementary system, although it should
be noted that if workers must carry themselves during this period they will have
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diminished reserves of savings with which to supplement benefits limited to 50 per
cent of wages during the next 15 weeks. The qualifying conditions also limit the
significance of unemployment compensation in the total relief structure. All plans
limit the right to draw benefits to those who have been employed for not less than
a specified number of weeks during a defined preceding period. Many of them
relate the duration of benefit to the length of previous employment. In consequence,
in severe depressions many workers, although occupationally within the scope of
unemployment compensation laws, will fail to qualify for benefit.
In deciding the part to be played by unemployment compensation in the total
relief system, a number of considerations must be balanced. The decision must take
into account (I) the appropriateness of the financial methods normally resorted to
in unemployment compensation as compared with those available or actually utilized
in financing the residual system, (z) the appropriateness of the type of benefit
provided in unemployment compensation plans as compared with the forms of benefit
available in the residual system, and (3) the administrative convenience of unem-
ployment compensation as compared with other types of relief. Unfortunately these
considerations often lead to contradictory results.
FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS
It has become usual to associate unemployment compensation with a specific
method of financing: namely, the collection of contributions from employers and
workers, to which there is frequently added a predetermined contribution from
general taxation. In the American plans the major emphasis is placed upon con-
tributions from employers. This limitation is due pardy to the Administration's
own preference for a "self-sustaining" social insurance system (i.e., one which
receives no contribution from general taxation), partly to the belief that payroll
taxes can be utilized as a device for stabilizing employment, and partly to the opposi-
tion of organized labor to a workers' contribution. These considerations, together
with the incitement given in the tax-offset device of the Social Security Act to
setting up plans financed by a 2.7% payroll tax on employers, account largely for
the fact that all American plans provide for such a tax, as the major source of unem-
ployment compensation funds. Taxes on workers are provided for in a number of
cases (though often limited to 50% of the taxpayer's tax rate) but only in one case
is there any provision for a contribution from general taxation to provide for any-
thing more than part of the costs of administration.
Thus, if the self-sustaining social insurance principle be adhered to, the relative
importance of unemployment compensation in the total relief set-up will be de-
termined by the amount of money it is deemed expedient to raise by taxes on payrolls
and perhaps also on wages. The appropriateness of these taxes for financing unem-
ployment relief, is, however, coming to be more and more questioned. Admittedly
152 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
the tax on employers permits differentiation on the basis of risk and thus some
stimulus to preventive action. But the extent to which by taking thought employers
can control unemployment, is severely limited, and the narrow margin given by a
payroll tax of 2.7% does not permit of any great degree of differentiation. Payroll
taxes have the further disadvantage that they can be evaded, or in any case reduced
by increasing mechanization. In periods of depression they may be more deterrent
to enterprise than other types of taxes. Furthermore, their ultimate incidence is very
uncertain. A contribution from workers can be defended as a method of selecting
those workers who are to receive preferential treatment, but the low level of wages
precludes any significant recourse to this type of tax.
As a result of these limitations the funds raised for unemployment compensation,
if confined to these taxes, will be relatively small and there will be a need for a
correspondingly large residual relief program. Whether or not other tax sources
should be drawn upon in order to permit of an expanded unemployment compensa-
tion program will, from the financial angle, depend very largely upon the provision
made for financing the residual relief system. If this provision is disorderly, or if the
taxes available and the distribution of responsibility between various authorities are
such as to lead to undesirable economic or political consequences, it may be preferable
(in order to reduce this unwieldy residual burden to a minimum) to extend the
scope of the unemployment compensation system. This may necessitate providing
the additional funds out of general taxation.
Both Great Britain between 192o and 1931 and Germany from i93o onwards
have demonstrated the political and economic disadvantages of defining the scope
of the unemployment compensation system by reference to the yield of certain types
of taxes, regardless of the consequences on the size of the residual problem. In both
cases the entire relief structure was disorganized because of the unwillingness of
the central governments to shoulder the rapidly increasing residual relief bill, and the
inability of local authorities to do so, thanks to the lack of elasticity of local taxing
and borrowing resources.
In England there resulted an undesirable expansion of the unemployment com-
pensation system because, in the absence of an appropriately financed residual relief
system, this was the only way to relieve local finances of the growing relief burden.
In Germany the narrow scope of the insurance system was retained and, after a
period in which the mounting relief costs demoralized local finances and led to
undesirable economies in local welfare activities, its scope was restricted even further,
in order that the surplus insurance funds might be used by the federal government
for assisting the local authorities. But in each case, as the result of identifying certain
types of benefit with specific methods of financing or types of authority, the form
of benefit given to the unemployed was determined not by any rational criteria but
by the possibilities of shifting financial responsibility from one authority to another.
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THE APPROPRIATENESS OF VARious TYPES OF BENEFIT
The second factor which must be taken into account is the kind of benefits avail-
able through unemployment compensation as compared with those available in the
residual relief program. From the point of view of the recipient, the characteristic
that separates unemployment compensation is the more favorable conditions under
which the contractual benefits are given. No means test is applied, and, as a general
rule, there is no pressure to take work at less, or substantially less, than prevailing
wages for the duration of compensation rights. Frequently the insured worker is
protected against compulsion to take work other than that to which he is accustomed,
or in places distant from that in which he resides.
On the other hand, the money received may or may not be greater than under the
alternative relief system. For the low paid workers, limited under compensation
to 5o of wages, relief may be preferable, for it is usually distributed on the basis of
family needs. Where the residual relief system involves a work program (either in
the form of public works or work relief) it may again be preferable. The sum of
money obtained is likely to be greater than under unemployment compensation and
the average worker prefers a job to idleness.
From this point of view it may be'argued that unemployment compensation is
more suitable to short-period unemployment, leaving work relief and possibly higher
benefits for those workers who have exhausted their unemployment compensation
benefits. But if compensation is limited to workers in certain employments, pro-
vision must be made for the short-period unemployed in these excluded trades. If
they are to be treated under the residual system in the same way as the insured
workers who have exhausted their benefit rights (i.e., if the residual relief system is a
uniform one), difficulties may arise. Insured workers may find that as a result
of paying wage taxes they will receive, for the first weeks of unemployment, benefits
smaller in amount than those received by workers employed in the excluded trades.
The only difference between the insured and non-insured workers would then consist
in the conditions under which benefit is paid; the latter might, for example, receive
benefits not as a right but only on demonstration of need, etc. It remains to be'dis-
covered whether the average insured worker will regard the differences in conditions
for benefit (in contrast to the amount and nature of benefits) as an adequate justifica-
tion for the contribution that he may be called upon to make. The alternative is to
treat the short-period unemployed in the excluded employments on an entirely
different basis from either the insured worker or the long-period unemployed who
have exhausted insurance benefits. But this will involve yet a third relief system.
In any case, the existence of preferential relief systems in a society which is un-
willing to allow workers and their families to starve for lack of income, will neces-
sitate some ultimate, though possibly deterrent, form of maintenance. If unemployed
workers on work programs cannot be fired for inefficiency because there is no alter-
native relief system, the economic value and social desirability of work relief may
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be reduced. The most effective control against malingering and other abuses avail-
able to an unemployment compensation system disappears if denial of insurance
benefit is no hardship because the benefits of the residual relief system are more
generous.
Once again both Great Britain and Germany have demonstrated the undesirabil-
ity, if not the ultimate impossibility, of attempting through an unemployment insur-
ance or compensation system to segregate certain workers for special types of benefit,
regardless of the types of benefit available in the residual system. In England the
residual relief system until 1931 was so unsatisfactory to the recipient as compared
with the preferential compensation system that there was irresistible political pres-
sure to extend the latter to workers who, if the original principles of the law had
been adhered to, should have been excluded. In Germany the relief system was
severely criticized by social workers and economists after i93o, because maintenance
of the preferential insurance benefits regardless of their relationship to those available
under the residual system, involved discrepancies in treatment for apparently sim-
ilarly situated workers, that were difficult to justify.
The nature of the benefits given by unemployment compensation and other forms
of relief has also its economic aspects. It is undesirable that workers should be put
on work relief projects immediately they lose their ordinary jobs, since they would
thus be prevented from seeking reemployment during the period when their chances
are greatest. Moreover, it is rare that work relief projects offer unemployed workers
jobs of the kind to which they have been accustomed. It is doubtful whether workers
(especially the skilled or semi-skilled) should be expected to undertake these different
types of work until it is evident that there is no longer any demand for their normal
services. Work relief may then be appropriate as a method of re-training, or to
maintain morale. Since work relief is likely to be more expensive and more trouble-
some to administer than straight cash relief, it should presumably be confined to
those unemployed who are most in need of this type of benefit. The long-period
unemployed suggest themselves as obvious candidates. But it is doubtful whether,
if work relief is to be the normal type of benefit offered by the residual system, 15
weeks is a reasonable pbint at which to draw the line between workers who should
receive cash benefits and those who should be relieved through a work program.
There is yet another economic aspect to this problem. An unemployment relief
system which provides benefits as a right without pressure to accept jobs at less than
prevailing wages involves an economic risk to the community as a whole. It is
essentially a relaxation of the pressure on workers to conform to market prices. Such
a relaxation will postpone wage readjustments which may be a serious matter if there
is a general depression due largely to maladjustment in wage rates. The extent of
this risk will be determined by the period for which these "non-pressure" benefits are
given. Some relaxation of the pressure during the first weeks of unemployment is
in the general interest. It is undesirable that workers should be pressed to seek
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unfamiliar jobs or jobs at less than prevailing rates until it becomes clear that the
demand for their services in their old employments or at the old wage level is un-
likely to revive. It is, however, questionable whether the 15 weeks breathing spell
allowed for in the average American system is long enough to permit the true state
of affairs to be diagnosed.
It is, moreover, impossible to know at the beginning of a trade recession whether
the remedy lies in a general reduction of wages. But it is clear that this relaxation
of pressure on wage rates cannot be indefinite. Thus the proper scope of unemploy-
ment compensation in the total relief situation will depend partly on the extent to
which any community is prepared to run the risk of postponing desirable economic
readjustments. It cannot be determined without taking into account the underlying
economic situation. A richer community can afford to take a greater risk by
extending the period for which unemployment compensation benefits are payable
than a poorer community. It is improbable that this decision can be made once
and for all.
ADMINISTRATIVE CoNsIDERATIoNs
The final group of considerations that must play a part in determining the scope
of unemployment compensation are administrative. As compared with other types
of relief, unemployment compensation has both administrative disadvantages and
advantages. It is probably more complicated as a method of collecting the necessary
funds than a system relying on the proceeds of general taxation. It involves the
keeping of elaborate records and the levying and collecting of special taxes. On the
other hand, this work can be done in an orderly way and is spread evenly from
year to year. There is no peak load. As a result of this routine accumulation of
records unemployment compensation presents great advantages as a method of
paying benefits.
In the first place, the realm of administrative discretion is greatly reduced and
payment becomes much more nearly automatic. The claim of a worker to be
qualified can be checked from the existing records, no means test is involved, and the
right of the workers to refuse jobs at less than prevailing wages greatly simplifies the
problem of the administrator. For a defined number of weeks of unemployment it
is not necessary to decide whether in each individual case there should be pressure
to accept work below prevailing wages, and, in many systems, work that is un-
familiar. The determination of the amount of benefit is also automatic (in contrast
with home relief where each worker's benefit depends upon his individual needs).
Secondly, the type of benefit given greatly simplifies the administration. Unem-
ployment compensation calls only for the payment of a cash benefit. Thus the prob-
lems associated with work relief, the selection of appropriate workers and projects,
and the determination of wage rates and conditions of work do not arise. Indeed,
its administrative convenience is one of the great arguments in favor of unemploy-
ment compensation as a method of unemployment relief. The relative part to be
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played by unemployment compensation in the total relief set-up will be partly de-
termined by the extent to which this administrative convenience would outweigh
possible economic or financial disadvantages of extending the system. If the cost
of compiling records of payments is considerable, a system which utilizes this con-
venient mechanism for paying benefits only during the first 15 weeks of unemploy-
ment fails to reap much advantage from the heavy overhead involved in the
permanent record-keeping system.
CONCLUSION
Unfortunately the three basic considerations discussed in the preceding sections
often lead to conflicting results. It would indeed be remarkable if the sum raised
by exploiting wage and payroll or any other taxes to the degree indicated by fiscal
and economic considerations should be exactly that needed to finance an unemploy-
ment compensation system of a magnitude found to be desirable by reference to our
other two sets of considerations. Yet the foreign experience suggests that there can
be no satisfactory partial or unintegrated solution of the problem of unemployment
relief. Where can a beginning be made? Do some considerations out-weigh others?
Since no one type of tax is obviously both appropriate and adequate to finance an
unemployment relief program, the scope of an unemployment compensation system
should be determined by reference to the economic costs and administrative con-
venience of benefits of this type as compared with those of other available forms of
benefit, i.e., by reference to the second and third of the considerations discussed in
this paper. The institutional set-up should, however, make provision for calm and
periodic revision of this decision. Some kinds of benefits are more costly than others
from both the financial and the broader economic point of view, and can be more
easily borne at some times than others.
The problem of financing is secondary. The approximate total sum to be spent
on relief will be set by the decisions as to the types of benefit to be given and the
relative importance of each in the total system. The financial problem then becomes
one of discovering appropriate and available taxes. If it is desired to finance unem-
ployment compensation at least in part by wage and payroll taxes, and these should
prove inadequate to carry a plan of the scope indicated by social, economic and
administrative considerations, the additional funds must be supplied from some
other source. Within the limits of this brief paper it is not possible to discuss the
details of the financing of the residual relief system.
